NYLS Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 1 Volume XXXVIII, Numbers 1-4, 1993

Article 14

January 1993

FALSE PROMISES: FEMINIST ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LEGISLATION
Lisa Duggan
Nan D. Hunter
Carole S. Vance

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review

Recommended Citation
Lisa Duggan, Nan D. Hunter & Carole S. Vance, FALSE PROMISES: FEMINIST ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
LEGISLATION, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1993).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

FALSE PROMISES: FEMINIST ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY
LEGISLATION*
LISA DUGGAN, NAN D. HUNTER & CAROLE S. VANCE**

I. INTRODUCTION

In the United States, after two decades of increasing community
tolerance for dissenting or disturbing sexual or political materials, the

1980s have produced a momentum for retrenchment. In an atmosphere
of increased conservatism, support for new repressive legislation of
various kinds-from an Oklahoma law forbidding schoolteachers from
advocating homosexuality' to new anti-pornography laws passed in
Minneapolis 2 and Indianapolis 3-has emerged as a powerful force.
* 0 Copyright by Lisa Duggan, Nan D. Hunter, and Carole S. Vance 1985.
Reprintedfrom WOiEN AaAINST CENSORSHP (Vakda Burstyn ed., 1985). Not to be
reprinted without permission of authors. Annotating footnotes have been added by the
editors.
** Lisa Duggan is an Assistant Professor of American Studies at New York
University. Nan D. Hunter is an Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School.
Carole S. Vance is a Research Scientist at the Columbia University School of Public
Health. For stimulating discussion and political comradeship, thanks to FACT (Feminist
Anti-Censorship Task Force), New York, and to members of the Scholar and the
Feminist IX study group (Julie Abraham, Hannah Alderfer, Meryl Altmann, Jan Boney,
Frances Doughty, Kate Ellis, Faye Ginsburg, Diane Harriford, Beth Jaker, Barbara Kerr,
Mary Clare Lennon, Marybeth Nelson, Ann Snitow, Paula Webster and Ellen Willis).
Special thanks to Rayna Rapp and Janice Irvine for comments and criticisms, to
Lawrence Krasnoff for graphics and to Ann Snitow for aid above and beyond the call of
duty. We are grateful to Varda Burstyn for her helpful suggestions and patience. We
remain responsible for the opinions expressed here.
1. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(A)(2) (1981) (allowing suspension of public
school teachers for "advocating, solicitating, imposing, encouraging or promoting public
or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that such
conduct will come to the attention of school children or school employees"). This law
was later held unconstitutional. See National Gay Task Force v. Oklahoma City Bd. of
Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
2. Minneapolis, Minn., Ordinance (Dec. 30, 1983; July 13, 1984) (amending
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139); Minneapolis, Minn.,
Ordinance (Dec. 30, 1983; July 13, 1984) (amending MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF
ORDINANcES tit. 7, ch. 141). The two ordinances were passed twice by the city council
but vetoed each time by the mayor. Chapters 139 and 141 of the Minneapolis, Minn.,
Code of Ordinances, as amended by the two ordinances, will be collectively referred to
hereinafter as the "Minneapolis Ordinance."
See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, andSpeech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography](noting the
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The anti-pornography laws have mixed roots of support, however.
Though they are popular with the conservative constituencies that4

traditionally favor legal restrictions on sexual expression of all kinds,
they were drafted and are endorsed by anti-pornography feminists, who

oppose traditional obscenity and censorship laws. The model law of this
type was drawn up in the politically progressive city of Minneapolis by
two radical feminists, author Andrea Dworkin and attorney Catharine
MacKinnon.5 It was passed by the city council, but vetoed by the
mayor. 6 A similar law, enacted in Indianapolis,' was ruled

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1986.
Dworkin, MacKinnon and their feminist supporters believe that these

proposed anti-pornography ordinances are not censorship laws." They
also claim that the legislative effort behind them is based on feminist
legislative history of the ordinance); E.R. Shipp, A Feminist Offensive Against
Exploitation, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1984, § 4, at 2 (reporting that Minneapolis Mayor
Donald M. Fraser vetoed the ordinance because, according to him, it "threatened First
Amendment guarantees").
3. Indianapolis and Marion County, Ind., General Ordinance No. 24, 1984 (Apr.
23, 1984) (amending INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., CODE ch. 16, §§ 16-1
to -28); Indianapolis and Marion County, Ind., General Ordinance No. 35, 1984 (June
11, 1984) (further amending INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., CODE ch. 16,
§§ 16-1, -3, -16, -17, -26, & -27). Chapter 16 of the Indianapolis and Marion County,
Ind., Code, as amended by one or both of these two ordinances, will be referred to
hereinafter as the "Indianapolis Ordinance."
4. See Lisa Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct.
16, 1984, at 11; Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of
Pornography,79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1114-16, 1164-66 (1993) (noting that these groups
include the National Coalition Against Pornography, Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum, and
Concerned Women for America, and arguing that when women's rights advocates ally
themselves with such groups over pornography, they promote the conservatives' antifeminist agenda while undermining women's rights).
5. See MacKinnon, Pornography,supranote 2, at 1 (acknowledging that both the
author and Andrea Dworkin conceived of the ordinances and listing those who helped
them pass such laws).
6. See supra note 2.
7. Indianapolis Ordinance, supranote 3; see also Shipp, supranote 2 (reporting that
the Indianapolis ordinance was adopted by the city-county council by a vote of 24 to 5,
and signed into law by Indianapolis Mayor William H. Hudnut).
8. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), affg 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
9. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Pornography,supranote 2, at 2, 67-68 (arguing that antipornography laws are consistent with the First Amendment).
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support.' Both of these claims are dubious at best. Though the new
laws are civil laws that allow individuals to sue the makers, sellers,
distributors or exhibitors of pornography," and not criminal laws leading
to arrest and imprisonment, their censoring impact would be substantially
as severe as criminal obscenity laws. Materials could be removed from
public availability by court injunction, 2 and publishers and booksellers

could be subject to potentially endless legal harassment. Passage of the
laws was therefore achieved with the support of right-wing elements who

expect the new laws to accomplish what censorship efforts are meant to
accomplish. 3 Ironically, many anti-feminist conservatives backed these
10. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Liberalism and the Death of Feminism, in THE
SEXUAL LiBERALS AND THE ATTAcK ON FPMINISM 3, 9 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice
G. Raymond eds., 1990) (stating that MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin conceived and
designed the model pornography law based on "the politics of the women's movement"
that they believed they were a part of, and "fielded it with others who were under the
same illusion").
11. See Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 141.60(a)(1) ("An individual
alleging a violation of this ordinance may bring a civil action directly in court."); id. §§
139.40(o & (/(3) (defining "discrimination against women" to include "[tihe production,
sale, exhibition, or distribution of pornography" and giving "[alny woman... a cause
of action hereunder as a woman acting against the subordination of women");
Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, §§ 16-3(g)(4) & (g)(4)(C) (defining "trafficking
in pornography" to include "[t]he production, sale, exhibition, or distribution of
pornography" and giving "[any woman.., a cause of action hereunder as a woman
acting against the subordination of women"). Section 16-3(g)(4)(C) of the Indianapolis
Ordinance was later amended to delete the civil cause of action. See Indianapolis and
Marion County, Ind., General Ordinance No. 35, 1984 (June 11, 1984) (amending
INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., CODE ch. 16, §§ 16-1, -3, -16, -17, -26,
& -27).
12. See Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 141.50()(3) ("[A] hearing
committee or court may order relief, including the removal of violative material,
permanent injunction against the sale, exhibition or distribution of violative material, or
any other relief deemed just and equitable, including reasonable attorney's fees.");
Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 16-27(a) (permitting broad sanctions against
violators, including temporary or permanent injunctive relief, affirmative relief, and
equitable relief).
13. See Debate Persistson Rights and Smut, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 21, 1984, at A17
(reporting that feminists and conservatives united in coalitions to pass MacKinnon-style
ordinances because that approach served to "wipe out adult bookstores, theaters and
massage parlors where zoning and criminal obscenity laws have failed"); Court Says
PornographyNot Sex Discrimination, Ci. TRm., Feb. 25, 1986, at 1 (reporting that
feminists who oppose pornography because they believe it leads to violence against
women, joined with conservatives who oppose the material on moral grounds to propose
ordinances defining pornography as sex discrimination, not as obscenity).
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In Indianapolis, the law was

supported by extreme right-wing religious fundamentalists, including
members of the Moral Majority, while there was no local feminist
support.15 In other cities, traditional pro-censorship forces expressed
interest in the new approach to banning sexually explicit materials. 6

Meanwhile, anti-censorship feminists became alarmed at these new
developments and are seeking to galvanize feminist opposition to the new
anti-pornography legislative strategy pioneered in Minneapolis. 17
One is tempted to'ask in astonishment, how can this be happening?

How can feminists be entrusting the patriarchal state with the task of
legally distinguishing between permissible and impermissible sexual

images? But in fact this new development is not as surprising as it at first
seems. Pornography has come to be seen as a central cause of women's
oppression by a significant number of feminists. 8 Andrea Dworkin
argues that pornography is the root of virtually all forms of exploitation
and discrimination against women.' 9 It is a short step from such a belief
14. See DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY 87
(1989) (detailing the political atmosphere surrounding the passage of the Minneapolis
Ordinance).
15. See Shipp, supranote 2 (reporting that the Rev. Greg Dixon, a former Moral
Majority official, along with his followers, packed city council hearings to lobby for the
proposed ordinance). See also Walter Goodman, Battle on PornographySpurredby New
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1984, at A8 (reporting that the Moral Majority supported
the Indianapolis proposal); Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, BriefAmici Curiae of
Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et aL, in American Booksellers Association v.
Hudnut, 21 J.L. REFoRM 69, 74 (1987-1988) (reprinting and discussing the amicus curiae
brief of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT) and others in Hudnut, and
noting that a broad range of feminists and feminist organizations opposed the Indianapolis
ordinance, including Kate Millett, Adrienne Rich, and the Women's Legal Defense
Fund).
16. See, e.g., John Rather, PornographyBill Stirs Furorin Suffolk, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1984, § 21, at 1 (describing Michael D'Andre, a backer of the proposed antipornography bill in Suffolk County, New York, as "a conservative Republican who has
a narrow interpretation of the First Amendment").
17. See e.g., Hunter & Law, supranote 15.
18. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINRON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 197 (1989) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE] (stating that
pornography, in the feminist view, "institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy");
see also ROSEMARY TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 11216 (1989) (indicating that anti-pornography feminists see pornography as an issue of male
power exerted over females, not one of sex).
19. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN PossEsSINoWoMN24-25
(1989) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY] (stating that the "major theme of
pornography is male power," and that the degradation of women in pornography "exists
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to the conviction that laws against pornography can end the inequality of
the sexes. But this analysis takes feminists very close-indeed, far too
close-to measures that will ultimately support conservative, anti-sex, procensorship forces in American society, for it is with these forces that
women have forged alliances in passing such legislation.
The first feminist-inspired anti-pornography law was passed in
Minneapolis in 1983.20 Local legislators had been frustrated when their2
zoning restrictions on porn shops were struck down in the courts. '
Public hearings were held to discuss a new zoning ordinance. The
Neighborhood Pornography Task Force of South and South Central
Minneapolis invited Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, who
were teaching a course on pornography at the University of Minnesota, to
testify.'
They proposed an alternative that, they claimed, would
completely eliminate, rather than merely regulate, pornography. They
suggested that pornography be defined as a form of sex discrimination,
and that an amendment to the city's civil rights law be passed to proscribe
it. City officials hired Dworkin and MacKinnon to develop their new
approach and to organize another series of public hearings.
The initial debate over the legislation in Minneapolis was intense, and
opinion was divided within nearly every political grouping.I By
contrast, the public hearings held before the city council were tightly
controlled and carefully orchestrated; speakers invited by Dworkin and
MacKinnon-sexual abuse victims, counselors, educators, and social
to postulate, exercise, and celebrate male power").

20. See Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2.
21. See Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 227 N.W.2d 370, 372-73 (Minn. 1975)
(holding that the zoning ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint on
freedom of expression); see generally Goodman, supra note 15, at A8 (reporting that
pornography businesses have generally been protected by the courts against local efforts
to close them).
22. See Shipp, supra note 2, at 2.

23. See id.; see also DWORKN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at xxviii-xxix
(stating that she and Catharine MacKinnon were hired by the city of Minneapolis to draft
an amendment to the city's civil rights law, whereby pornography would be recognized
as a "violation of the civil rights of women, as a form of sex discrimination, [and] an

abuse of human rights").
24. See Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution:
The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 607, 617-20 (1987)
(describing the public debate which took place before the MacKinnon and Dworkin
hearings); DOWNS, supra note 14, at 87 (noting the divisions existing within political
and social groups in Minneapolis at the time of the passage of the ordinance).
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scientists-testified about the harm pornography does to women.28

(Dworkin and MacKinnon's goal was to compile a legislative record that
would help the law withstand inevitable court challenges.) Supported by
anti-pornography feminists, neighborhood groups concerned about the

effects of porn shops on residential areas, and conservatives opposed to
the availability of sexually explicit materials for "moral" reasons, the
legislation passed.'
In Indianapolis, the alignment of forces was different.

For the

previous two years, conservative anti-pornography groups had grown in
strength and public visibility, but had been frustrated in their efforts.27
The police department could not convert its obscenity arrests into
convictions; the city's zoning law was also tied up in court challenges.8
At that point, Mayor William Hudnut I, a Republican and a Presbyterian
minister, learned of the Minneapolis law. He thought Minneapolis's
approach might be the solution to his city's problems.? Beulah
Coughenour, a conservative Republican stop-ERA activist, was recruited
to sponsor the legislation in the city-county council.?

Coughenour engaged MacKinnon as consultant to the city.
MacKinnon worked with the Indianapolis city prosecutor (a well-known
anti-vice zealot), the city's legal department, and Coughenour on the
25. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 24, at 620-29 (describing how Dworkin
and MacKinnon prepared for the hearings and detailing testimony given at the hearings);
see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamation and Discrimination,71
B.U. L. REv. 793,798-99 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Defamation] (describing some
of the testimony).
26. See Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2 (tabulating city council vote).
Nonetheless, the ordinance was vetoed by the mayor, and the city council failed to
override the veto. Shipp, supra note 2, at 2.
27. See, e.g., Goodman, supranote 15, at A8 (reporting that local efforts around
the country have failed to close sex shops, peep shows, and X-rated movie theaters, and
discussing a federal court decision which overturned a Miami, Florida ordinance
outlawing sexually explicit programs on cable television).
28. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Cutshaw, 443 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
(massage parlor owners and operators, an adult-theater owner, and adult bookstore
owners sued the City of Indianapolis seeking a declaratory judgment that the city's
zoning ordinance was unconstitutional).
29. See E.R. Shipp, Civil Rights Law Against PornographyIs Challenged, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1984, at A14 (reporting that after the Minneapolis ordinance was vetoed
by Mayor Donald Fraser of Minneapolis, Mayor William Hudnut of Indianapolis began
the effort to draft a similar ordinance for Indianapolis).
30. See id. (reporting that Indianapolis mayor William Hudnut introduced Beulah
A. Coughenour, who worked with MacKinnon on the Minneapolis ordinance, to
Indianapolis city council member Charlee Hoyt, at a National League of Cities meeting.
Hoyt would later co-sponsor the Indianapolis ordinance.).

19931
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legislation."' The law received the support of neighborhood groups, the
Citizens for Decency, and the Coalition for a Clean Community. There
were no crowds of feminist supporters-in fact, there were no feminist
supporters at all. The only feminists to make public statements opposed
the legislation, which was nevertheless passed in a council meeting packed
with 300 religious fundamentalists. 2 All twenty-four Republicans voted
for its passage; all five Democrats opposed it to no avail.

Before the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional,l mutated
versions of the Dworkin-MacKinnon bill began to appear. A version of
the law introduced in Suffolk County, Long Island, in New York
emphasized its conservative potential-pornography was said to cause
"sodomy" and "disruption" of the family unit, in addition to rape, incest,
exploitation, and other acts "inimical to the public good."' In Suffolk,
the law was advanced by a conservative, anti-ERA male legislator who
wished to "restore ladies to what they used to be."3 5 The Suffolk County

bill clearly illustrates the repressive, anti-feminist potential of the new
anti-pornography legislation.
The support of such legislation by anti-pornography feminists marks
a critical moment in the feminist debate over sexual politics. We need to
examine carefully these proposed new laws and expose their underlying
31. See id.
32. See Shipp, supra note 2 (reporting that the sponsors of the Indianapolis
ordinance had the support of the Rev. Greg Dixon, a former Moral Majority official,
who, with his followers, packed Indianapolis city council hearings to lobby for passage
of the ordinance).
33. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), aff'g 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
34. See Suffolk County, N.Y., Resolution No. 1920-84 to Limit Violence Against
Women § 1 (September 11, 1984) [hereinafter Suffolk County Resolution]. The
resolution proposed that Suffolk County adopt as part of its record and findings the
transcript of the Minneapolis hearings on pornography as discrimination against women.
Id. The resolution also adopted a definition of "objectionable pornography" similar to
the definition provided in the Minneapolis and Indianapolis pornography ordinances. Id.
§ 2. Unlike the Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances however, the Suffolk County
resolution only provided an aggrieved party with a right to bring a civil action in court,
not before a civil rights or human relations commission. Id. § 3. The resolution failed
to pass by a vote of 8-9. Id. See also Rather, supra note 16, at 1 (reporting that the
bill's author was concerned about a decline in public morality and pornography's threat
to the "health, safety, morals and general welfare" of Suffolk County residents).
35. Lisa Duggan & Ann Snitow, Porn Law Is About Images, Not Power, N.Y.
NEwSDAY, Sept. 26, 1984, at 65. The resolution was co-sponsored by Suffolk County
legislators Sandra M. Bachety and Joseph Rizzo. See Suffolk Officials Vote Down Bill
on Pornography,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1984, at B5 (reporting that Michael D'Andre,
sponsor of the bill, described the bill as "part of a crusade to restore public morality").
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assumptions. We need to know why these proposals, for all their apparent
feminist rhetoric, actually appeal to conservative anti-feminist forces, and
why feminists should move in a different direction.
11. DEFINITIONS: THE CENTRAL FLAW
The anti-pornography ordinances introduced in Minneapolis and

Indianapolis were framed as amendments to municipal civil rights laws.'
They provide for complaints to be filed against pornography in the same
manner that complaints are filed against employment discrimination. 37
If enforced, the laws would make illegal public or private availability
(except in libraries) of any materials deemed pornographic.38
Such material could be the object of a lawsuit on several grounds.
The ordinances would penalize four kinds of behavior associated with
pornography: its production, sale, exhibition, or distribution
("trafficking");" coercion into pornographic performance; ° forcing
pornography 42on a person; 41 and assault or physical attack due to
pornography.

36. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 1; Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note
3, § 1.
37. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 1 (providing that the "hearing
committee [of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission] or court may order relief");
Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 4 (providing that "[a] complaint charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in a discriminatory practice" prohibited by the
Indianapolis ordinance may be filed by any person "aggrieved by the [discriminatory]
practice" or a member of the board or employee of the office who has "reasonable cause
to believe that a violation" of the ordinance has occurred); see also MacKinnon,
Pornography,supra note 2, at 25 (stating that both the Indianapolis and Minneapolis
ordinances' "principle enforcement mechanism is the civil rights commission" even
though both ordinances provide for direct access to courts as well).
38. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(0(1); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra
note 3, § 2 (g)(4)(A).
39. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote2, § 4(4; Indianapolis Ordinance, supranote
3, § 2 (g)(4).
40. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4(m); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 2(g)(5).
41. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4(n); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 2(g)(6).
42. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4(o); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 2(g)(7).
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Under such a law, a woman "acting as a woman against the
subordination of women" could file a complaint;' men could also file
complaints if they could "prove injury in the same way that a woman is
injured."" The procedural steps in the two ordinances differ, but they
generally allow the complainant either to file an administrative complaint

with the city's equal opportunity
Indianapolis),'

commission (Minneapolis

or

or to file a lawsuit directly in court (Minneapolis).

If

the local commission found the law had been violated, it would file a
lawsuit.47 By either procedure the court-not "women"-would have the
final say on whether the materials fit the definition of pornography, and
it would have the authority to award monetary damages or issue an
injunction or order preventing further distribution of the material in
question."
The Minneapolis ordinance defines pornography as "the sexually
explicit subordination of women, graphically depicted, whether in pictures
or words." 49 To be actionable, materials would also have to fall within

one of a number of categories: nine in the Minneapolis ordinance, six in
the Indianapolis version.'
Although proponents claim that the Minneapolis and Indianapolis

ordinances represent a new way to regulate pornography, 5' the strategy
is still laden with our culture's old, repressive approach to sexuality. The
implementation of such laws hinges on the definition of pornography as
interpreted by the judiciary. The definition provided in the Minneapolis

legislation is vague, leaving critical phrases such as "the sexually explicit
43. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(1)(3); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 4(b).
44. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 4(b). The Minneapolis Ordinance
allows a cause of action for a man "who alleges injury by pornography in the way
women are injured by it." Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4(/(3).
45. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 1(3); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra
note 3, § 4(a).
46. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 2(a)(1).
47. See, e.g., Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 6(a) (providing that "the
[equal opportunity advisory] board may file in its own name... a complaint...").
48. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 1(0(3); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra
note 3, § 6(a), (c).
49. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1).
50. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(i)-(ix); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 2(q)(1)-(6).
51. See, e.g., DwoRKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supranote 19, at xxxiii (stating that the
new pornography laws would allow women hurt by pornography to "redraw" the world
created by "the makers, sellers, exhibitors, and distributors of pornography");
MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 2, at 28 (describing her approach towards
pornography as a "new legal theory, a new law...").
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subordination of women, " 52 "postures of sexual submission, "'

and

"whores by nature "' to the interpretation of the citizen who files a
complaint and to the judge who hears the case. The legislation does not
prohibit just the images of rape and abusive sexual violence that most
supporters claim to be its target, but instead drifts toward covering an
increasingly wide range of sexually explicit material.
The most problematic feature of this approach is a conceptual flaw
embedded in the law itself. Supporters of this type of legislation say that
the target of their efforts is misogynous, sexually explicit, and violent
representation, whether in pictures or words. 55 Indeed, the feminist antipornography movement is fueled by women's anger at the most repugnant
examples of pornography. 6 But a close examination of the wording of
the model legislative text, and examples of purportedly actionable material
offered by proponents of the legislation in briefs defending the
Indianapolis ordinance in a court challenge, suggests that the law is
actually aimed at a range of material considerably broader than what the
proponents claim is their target.57 The discrepancies between the law's
explicit and implicit aims have been almost invisible to us because these
distortions are very similar to distortions about sexuality in the culture as
a whole. The legislation and supporting texts deserve close reading.
Hidden beneath illogical transformations, non sequiturs, and highly
permeable definitions are familiar sexual scripts drawn from mainstream,
52. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1).
53. Id. § 3(gg)()(v).

54. Id.§ 3(gg)(1)(vii).
55. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Defamation, supra note 25, at 797-98, 801 (discussing
her reasons for developing and supporting the anti-pornography ordinances, and defining
their proscriptive objective as "graphic sexually explicit pictures or words that
subordinate women").
56. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORMKN, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,
Pornography, and Equality, in LETrERS FROM A WAR ZONE: WarriNus 1976-1989, at
253,261 (stating, "[pornography] is women turned into subhumans, beaver, pussy, body
parts, genitals exposed, buttocks, breasts, mouths open and throats penetrated, covered
in semen, pissed on, shitted on, hung froni light fixtures, tortured, maimed, bleeding,
disemboweled, killed"); Morrison Torrey, We Get the Message-Pornographyin the
Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1992) (referring to a "woman being shoved into
a meat grinder" as an example of the viciousness of pornography).
57. See, e.g., Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, at 4, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316
(S.D. Ind. 1984) (No. IP84-791C), aft'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986) [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition]; Brief of Linda
Marchiano, Amicus Curiae, at 32, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp.
1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (No. IP 84-791C), aft'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) [hereinafter Brief of Linda Marchiano].

1993]
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sexist culture that potentially could have very negative consequences for
women.
The Venn diagram illustrates the three areas targeted by the law, and
represents a scheme that classifies words or images that have any of three
characteristics: violence, sexual explicitness, or sexism.
Clearly, a text or an image might have only one characteristic.
Material can be violent but not sexually explicit or sexist: for example,
a war movie in which both men and women suffer injury or death without
regard to or because of their gender. Material can be sexist but not
sexually explicit or violent. A vast number of materials from mainstream
media-television, popular novels, magazines, newspapers-come to mind,
depicting, for example, either distraught housewives or the "happy
sexism" of the idealized family, with mom self-sacrificing, other-directed,
and content. Finally, material can be sexually explicit but not violent or
sexist: for example, the freely chosen sexual behavior depicted in sex
education films or women's own explicit writing about sexuality.
As the diagram illustrates, areas can
also intersect, reflecting a range of
combinations of the three
characteristics. Images can be violent
Violent
and sexually explicit without being
sexist-for example, a narrative about a
rape in a men's prison, or a
Seximly
documentary about the effect of a rape
ExullS
The latter example
on a woman.
Explicit
illustrates the importance of context in
a
evaluating whether material that is
sexually explicit and violent is also I
sexist. The intent of the maker, the
context of the film, and the perception
of the viewer together render a depiction of a rape sympathetic,
harrowing, even educational, rather than sensational, victim-blaming, and
laudatory.
Another possible overlap is between material that is violent and sexist
but not sexually explicit. Films or books that describe violence directed
against women by men in a way that clearly shows gender antagonism and
inequality, and sometimes strong sexual tension, but no sexual
explicitness, fall into this category-for example, the popular genre of
slasher films in which women are stalked, terrified, and killed by men, or
accounts of mass murder of women, fueled by male rage. Finally, a third
point of overlap arises when material is sexually explicit and sexist
without being violent-that is, when sex is consensual but still reflects
themes of male superiority and female abjectness. Some sex education
materials could be included in this category, as well as a great deal of
regular pornography.
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The remaining domain, the inner core, is one in which the material
is simultaneously violent, sexually explicit, and sexist-for example, an

image of a naked woman being slashed by a knife-wielding rapist. The
Minneapolis ordinance, however, does not by any means confine itself to
this material.
To be actionable as pornography under the law, material must be
judged by the courts to be "the sexually explicit subordination of women,
graphically depicted whether in pictures or in words that also includes at

least one or more" of nine criteria. 8 Of these, only four involve the
intersection of violence, sexual explicitness, and sexism, and then only
arguably." Even in these cases, many questions remain about whether
images with all three characteristics do in fact cause violence against

women.60

And the task of evaluating material that is ostensibly the

58. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 3(gg)(1)(i)-(ix). The ordinance states:
(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically
depicted, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the
following:
(i) women "arepresented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or
commodities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual
pleasure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas,
breasts, and buttocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced
to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals;
or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.
Id.
59. See id. § 3(gg)(1)(ii), (iii), (iv), and (ix) (violence in these sections of the
ordinance is defined as representations of women enjoying pain, experiencing sexual
pleasure in being raped, being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt, and
in sexual contexts of injury or torture).
60. See generally Donn Byrne & Kathryn Kelley, Introduction:Pornographyand
Sex Research, in PORNOGRAPHY ANi SEXUAL AGGRESSION 1, 4-10 (Neil M. Malamuth
& Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984) (arguing that the effects of exposure to erotica are
complex, and that attempts to censor pornography based on the findings of research into
those effects may be problematic at best, and counter-productive at worst); Varda
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target of these criteria becomes complicated-indeed, hopeless-because

most of the clauses that contain these criteria mix actions or qualities of
violence with those that are not particularly associated with violence."

The section that comes closest to the stated purpose of the legislation
is clause (iii): "women are presented as sexual objects who experience

sexual pleasure in being raped."' This clause is intended to cover
depictions of rape that are sexually explicit and sexist; the act of rape
itself signifies the violence. But other clauses are not so clear cut because
the list of characteristics often mixes signs or by-products of violence with
phenomena that are unrelated or irrelevant to judging violence.
Such a problem occurs with clause (iv): "women are presented as
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically
hurt."' All these except the first, "tied up," generally occur as a result
of violence. "Tied up," if part of consensual sex, is not violent and, for
some practitioners, not particularly sexist. Women who are tied up may
be participants in nonviolent sex play involving bondage, a theme in both
heterosexual and lesbian pornography.' Clause (ix) contains another
mixed list, in which "injury," "torture," "bleeding," "bruised," and
"hurt" are combined with phrases such as "degradation" and "shown as
filthy or inferior," neither of which is violent.' Depending on the
presentation, "filthy" and "inferior" may constitute sexually explicit
sexism, although not violence. "Degradation" is a sufficiently inclusive
term to cover most acts of which a viewer disapproves.
Several other clauses have little to do with violence at all; they refer
to material that is sexually explicit and sexist, thus falling outside the triad
of characteristics at which the legislation is supposedly aimed. For
example, movies in which "women are presented as dehumanized sexual
objects, things, or commodities"' may be infuriating and offensive to
feminists, but they are not violent.
Burstyn, Appendix 1: Making Sense of Researchon Pornography,in WOMEN AGAINST
CENsoRS-IP 181 (Varda Burstyn ed., 1985) (discussing the various forms of research
into the effects of exposure to pornography and depictions of violence).
61. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
62. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1)(iii).

63. Id.
§ 3(gg)(1)(iv).
64. See LINDA WI.lIAMS, HARD CoRE: POWER, PLEASURE, AND THE "FRENZY OF

THE VIsIBLE" 196-98 (1989) (describing different types of heterosexual pornography in
which bondageplays a role). See also GayleRubin, The LeatherMenace: Comments on
Politics and SIM, in COMING To PowER: WRITINoS AND GRAPHiCS ON LESBIAN S/M

194, 220-21 (Samois ed., 3d ed. 1987) (noting and discussing the existence of subgroups
in lesbian, gay and heterosexual communities that practice sadomasochism).
65. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1)(ix).
66. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(i).
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Finally, some clauses describe material that is neither violent nor
necessarily sexist.

Clause (v)-"women . . . in postures of sexual

submission [or sexual servility, including by inviting penetration]" 6 7--and
clause

(viii)-"women

. . . being penetrated

by

objects

or

animals"s---are sexually explicit, but not violent and not obviously sexist
unless one believes that penetration-whether heterosexual, lesbian, or
autoerotic is indicative of gender inequality and female oppression.
Similarly problematic are clauses that invoke representations of "women
. . .as whores by nature"' and "women's body parts . . . such that

women are reduced to those parts."'
Texts cited in support of the Indianapolis law show how broadly it
could be applied. In the amicus brief filed on behalf of Linda
Marehiano&in Indianapolis, Catharine MacKinnon offered the film Deep
Throat as an example of the kind of pornography covered by the law.
Deep Throat served a complicated function in this brief because the
movie, supporters of the ordinance argue, would be actionable on two
counts: coercion into pornographic performance because Marchiano
alleges that she was coerced into making the movie;' and trafficking in
pornography because the content of the film fWlls within one of the
categories in the Indianapolis ordinance's definition-that which prohibits
presenting women as sexual objects "through postures or positions of
servility or submission or display."' Proponents of the law have counted
on women's repugnance at allegations of coerced sexual acts to spill over
and discredit the sexual acts themselves in this movie.
The aspects of Deep Throat that MacKinnon considered to be
indicative of "sexual... subordination" are of particular interest because
any movie that depicted similar acts presumably could be banned under
the law.75 MacKinnon explained in her brief that the film "subordinates
67. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(v). The bracketed language was contained inthe ordinance as
originally proposed to the city council, but was dropped in the final version. See
DOWNS, supranote 14, at 44.

68. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(viii).
69. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(vii).
70. Id. § 3(gg)(1)(vi).
71. The woman who portrayed "Linda Lovelace" inthe film Deep Throat. See
Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 57, at 13.
72. See id. at iii
(asserting that Linda Marchiano isone example, "far from unique,"
of a woman who has suffered harm as a result of pornography).
73. Id. at 38.
74. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 2(q)(6).
Marchiano, supra note 57, at 38.

75. See Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 57, at 39.

See also Brief of Linda
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women by using women . . . sexually, specifically as eager servicing
receptacles for male genitalia and ejaculate. The majority of the film
presents 'Linda Lovelace' in, minimally, postures of submission and/or
servility."'76 In its brief, the City of Indianapolis concurred: "In the film
Deep Throat, a woman is being shown as being ever eager for oral
penetration by a series of men's penises, often on her hands and knees.
There are repeated scenes in which her genitalia are graphically displayed
and she is shown as enjoying men ejaculating on her face."'
These descriptions are very revealing since they suggest that multiple
partners, group sex, and oral sex subordinate women and hence are sexist.
The notion that the female character is "used" by men suggests that it is
improbable that a woman would engage in fellatio of her own accord.
Deep Throat does draw on several sexist conventions common in
advertising and the entire visual culture of woman as object of the male
gaze, and the assumption of heterosexuality, for example. But it is hardly
an unending paean to male dominance, since the movie contains many
contrary themes. In it, the main female character is shown as both
actively seeking her own pleasure and as -trying to please men; a
secondary female character is shown directing encounters with multiple
male partners. Both briefs describe a movie quite different from the one
viewers see.
At its heart, this analysis implies that heterosexual sex itself is sexist,
that women do not engage in it of their own volition, and that behavior
pleasurable to men is intrinsically repugnant to women. In some contexts,
for example, the representation of fellatio and multiple partners can be
sexist, but are we willing to concede that they always are? If not, then
what is proposed as actionable under the Indianapolis law includes merely
sexually explicit representation (the traditional target of obscenity laws),
which proponents of the legislation vociferously insist they are not
interested in attacking.7
Exhibits submitted with the City of Indianapolis brief and also
introduced in the public hearing further illustrate this point. Many of the
76. Id. at 38.

77. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 63.
78. See, e.g., The FirstAmendment, UnderFirefrom the Left: Whose Free Speech?
A Discussion of Two LeadingAuthorities, Moderated by Anthony Lewis, N.Y. TiMES,

Mar. 13, 1994, §6 (magazine), at 40, 57 (featuring a discussion between Catharine
MacKinnon and Floyd Abrams, a prominent First Amendment attorney, in which
MacKinnon distinguishes laws proposed by her and Andrea Dworkin from traditional
obscenity laws).
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exhibits were depictions of sadomasochism (SM).'
The court briefs
treat SM material as depicting violence and aggression, not consensual
sex, in spite of avowals to the contrary by many SM practitioners.'
With this legislation, then, a major question for feminists that has only
begun to develop would be closed for discussion. Instead, a simplistic
reduction has been advanced as the definitive feminist position. The
description of the material in the briefs focused on submissive women and
implied male domination, highlighting the similarity proponents would like
to find between all SM narratives and male/female inequality."1 The
actual exhibits, however, illustrated plots and power relations far more
diverse than the descriptions provided by MacKinnon and the City of
Indianapolis would suggest, including SM between women and female
dominant/male submissive SM.' For example, the Indianapolis brief
stated that in the magazine The Bitch Goddesses, "women are shown in
torture chambers with their nude body parts being tortured by their
'master' for 'even the slightest offense' . . .. [This] magazine shows a
woman in a scenario of torture."' But the brief failed to mention that
with one exception the dominants in this magazine are all female. This
kind of discrepancy characterized many examples offered in the briefs.
This is not to say that such representations do not raise questions for
feminists.
The current lively discussion about lesbian SM clearly
demonstrates that this issue is still unresolved." But in the Indianapolis
briefs all SM material was assumed to be male dominant/female
submissive, thereby squeezing a nonconforming reality into prepackaged,
inadequate-and therefore dangerous-categories. This legislation would
79. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, app. (listing
exhibits such as the magazines SophisticatedBondageand Rope, and films such as Lisa's
Training).
80. See, e.g., Rubin, The LeatherMenace, supranote 64, at 204-05 (noting that the
"SM community is obsessed with safety and has an elaborate folk technology of methods
to maximize sensation and minimize danger").
81. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 20-21
(describing the scenes of bondage and torture depicted in much of the material submitted
in exhibit); Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 57, at 13-14 (describing how Linda
Marchiano was forced against her will to perform sexual acts for her role as "Linda
Lovelace" in the movie Deep Throat).
82. See, e.g., WjLAMS, HARD CoRE,supra note 64, at 196 (stating that male
submissives apparently outweigh dominators in real-life heterosexual sadomasochistic
practice); see also Rubin, The LeatherMenace, supranote 64, at 215 (stating that there
is nothing inherently feminist or non-feminist about SM).
83. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supranote 57, at 63 (citation omitted).
84. See, e.g., Rubin, The LeatherMenace, supranote 64, at 212-18 (discussing the
strife within the feminist movement over lesbian SM).
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virtually eliminate all SM pornography by recasting it as violent, thereby
attacking a sexual minority while masquerading as an attempt to end
violence against women.
Analysis of clauses in the Minneapolis ordinance and several examples
offered in court briefs filed in connection with the Indianapolis ordinance
show that the law targets material that is sexually explicit and sexist, but
ignores material that is violent and sexist, violent and sexually explicit,
only violent, or only sexist.
Certain troubling questions arise here, for if one claims, as some antipornography activists do, that there is a direct relationship between images
and behavior,' why should images of violence against women or
scenarios of sexism in general not be similarly proscribed? Why is sexual
explicitness singled out as the cause of women's oppression? For
proponents to exempt violent and sexist images, or even sexist images,
from regulation is inconsistent, especially since they are so pervasive.
Even more difficulties arise from the vagueness of certain terms
crucial in interpreting the ordinances. The term "subordination" is
especially important, since pornography is defined as the "sexually explicit
subordination of women."' The authors of this legislation intend it to
modify each of the clauses, and they appear to believe that it provides a
definition of sexism. that each example must meet.87 The term is never
defined in the legislation, yet the Indianapolis brief, for example, suggests
that the average viewer, on the basis of "his or her common understanding
of what it means for one person to subordinate another," should be able
to decide what is pornographic.8 But what kind of sexually explicit acts
place a woman in an inferior status? To some, any graphic sexual act
violates women's dignity and therefore subordinates them.' To others,
consensual heterosexual lovemaking within the boundaries of procreation
85. See, e.g., DwoRKMN, PORNOORAPHY, supranote 19, at 199-202 (discussing the
connection between pornography and the abuse of women).
86. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 3(gg)(1); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 2(q).
87. See Brief of Linda Marchiano, supranote 57, at 30 (claiming that pornography
is not "the presentation or discussion or depiction or portrayal of the 'idea of'
subordination... [but rather, pornography] is an active practice of the subordination of
women").
88. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 42.
89. See, e.g., DwoRKIN, PORNOoRAPHY, supra note 19, at 23 (describing sexual
intercourse as an act of possession by the male "which is simultaneously an act of
ownership, taking, force; it is conquering... requiring] that the male act on one who
has less power and this valuation is so deep, so completely implicit in the act, that the
one who is fucked is stigmatized as feminine during the act even when not anatomically
female").
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and marriage is acceptable, but heterosexual acts that do not have
reproduction as their aim lower women's status and hence subordinate
them. Still others accept a wide range of non-procreative, perhaps even
nonmarital, heterosexuality but draw the line at lesbian sex, which they
view as degrading.
The term "sex object" is also problematic.' The City of
Indianapolis's brief maintains that:
The term "sexual object," often shortened to "sex object," has
enjoyed a wide popularity in mainstream American culture in the
past fifteen years, and is used to denote the objectification of a
person on the basis of their sex or sex appeal. People know what
it means to disregard all aspects of personhood but sex, to reduce
a person to a tling used for sex."1
But, indeed, people do not agree on this point. The definition of "sex
object" is far from clear or uniform. For example, some feminist and
liberal cultural critics have used the term in to mean sex that occurs
without strong emotional ties and experience.' More conservative critics
maintain that any detachment of women's sexuality from procreation,
marriage, and family objectifies it, removing it from its "natural" web of
associations and context. Unredeemed and unprotected by domesticity and
family, women-and their sexuality-become things used by men. In both
these views, women are never sexually autonomous agents who direct and
enjoy their sexuality for their own purposes, but rather are victims. In the
same vein, other problematic terms include "inviting penetration, " '
"whores by nature"" and "positions of display."'
Through close analysis of the proposed legislation one sees how vague
the boundaries of the definitions that contain the inner core of the Veun
diagram really are. Their dissolution does not happen equally at all
points, but only at some: The inner core begins to include sexually explicit
90. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote2,§ 3(gg)(1)(i)-(iv); Indianapolis Ordinance,

supranote 3, § 2(q)(1)-(3), (6).
91. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 43.
92. See, e.g., Playboy Interiew: Befy Friedan, PLAYBOY, Sept., 1992, at 51, 52
(eliciting the argument by Betty Friedan, the well-known feminist, that the treatment of
women as sex objects deprives women, and men, of sexual and human fulfillment).
93. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1)(v). The clause "or sexual
servility, including by inviting penetration" was appended to subsection (v) of the
Minneapolis Ordinance but was deleted prior to passage. See Burstyn, supra note 60,
at 206; DOWNS, supra note 14, at 44.
94. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 3(gg)(1)(vii).
95. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 3, § 2(q)(6).
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and sexist material, and finally expands to include purely sexually explicit
material. Thus "sexually explicit" becomes identified and equated with
"violent" with no further definition or explanation.'

It is also striking that so many feminists have failed to notice that the
proposed laws (as well as examples of actionable material) cover so much
diverse work, not just that small and symbolic epicenter where many
forms of opposition to women converge. It suggests that for us, as well
as for others, sexuality remains a difficult area. We have no clearly
developed framework in which to think about sex equivalent to the
frameworks that are available for thinking about race, gender, and class
issues. Consequently, in sex, as in few other areas of human behavior,
unexamined and unjustifiable prejudice passes itself off as considered
opinion about what is desirable and normal. And finally, sex arouses
considerable anxiety, stemming from both the meeting with individual
difference and from the prospect-suggested by feminists themselves-that
sexual behavior is constructed socially and is not simply natural.
The law takes advantage of everyone's relative ignorance and anxious
ambivalence about sex, distorting and oversimplifying what confronts us
in building a sexual politics. For example, anti-pornography feminists
draw on several feminist theories about the role of violent, aggressive or
sexist representations.' The first is relatively straightforward: that these
images trigger men into action." The second suggests that violent
images act more subtly, to socialize men to act in sexist or violent ways
by making this behavior seem commonplace and more acceptable, if not
expected. 9 The third assumption is that violent, sexually explicit or
even sexist images are offensive to women, assaulting their sensibilities
and sense of self." Although we have all used metaphors to exhort
women to action or illustrate a point, anti-pornography proponents have
frequently used these conventions of speech as if they were literal
96. Id. § 2(q)(2), (3), (5); Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote2, § 3(gg)(1)(iii), (iv),

(x).
97. See generaUy MacKinnon,Defamation,supranote 25, at 798-800 (summarizing
some of the research that shows that pornography results in increased aggressive and
discriminatory behavior by men towards women, and that even non-violent pornography
which degrades and dehumanizes women has been shown to lower men's inhibitions
about aggression and callousness towards women).
98. See id. at 798 (describing how witnesses who related their experiences with
pornography at hearings held before the Minneapolis City Council "told how
pornography stimulates and condones rape").
99. See id. at 799 (citing research indicating that exposure to violent pornography
can lead some men to believe that "violence against women is acceptable").
100. See id. at 803 (stating that pornography "makes women a public sexual
spectacle... humiliates [them], and also at times offends their sensibilities").

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

statements of fact. But these metaphors have gotten out of hand, as Julie

Abraham has noted, for they fail to recognize that the assault committed
by a wife beater is quite different from the visual "assault" of a sexist ad
on TV. 1"1

The nature of that difference is still being clarified in a

complex debate within feminism that must continue; this law cuts off
speculation, settling on a causal relationship between image and action that
is starkly simple, if unpersuasive.
These metaphors also pave the way for reclassifying images that are
merely sexist as also violent and aggressive. Thus, it is no accident that
the briefs supporting the legislation first invoke violent images and rapidly
move to include sexist and sexually explicit images without noting that
they are different.' °2 The equation is made easier by the constant shifts
back to examples of depictions of real violence, almost to draw attention
away from the sexually explicit or sexist material that in fact would be
affected by the laws.'
Most important, what underlies this legislation, and the success of its
analysis in blurring and exceeding boundaries, is an appeal to a very
traditional view of sex: Sex is degrading to women. By this logic, any
illustrations or descriptions of explicit sexual acts that involve women are
in themselves affronts to women's dignity. In its brief, the City of
Indianapolis was quite specific about this point: "The harms caused by
pornography are by no means limited to acts of physical aggression. The
mere existence of pornography in society degrades and demeans all
women. " 4 Embedded in this view are several other familiar themes:
that sex is degrading to women, but not to men; that men are raving
beasts; that sex is dangerous for women; that sexuality is male, not
female; that women are victims, not sexual actors; that men inflict "it" on
women; that penetration is submission; that heterosexual sexuality, rather
than the institution of heterosexuality, is sexist.
These assumptions, in part intended, in part unintended, lead us back
to the traditional target of obscenity law: sexually explicit material. What
initially appeared novel, then, is really the reappearance of a traditional
theme. It is ironic that a feminist position on pornography incorporates
most of the myths about sexuality that feminism has struggled to displace.
101. Carole S. Vance's conversation with Julie Abraham.
102. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 4; Brief of
Linda Marchiano, supranote 57, at 18-20.
103. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supranote 57, at 3, 20, 62-63,
and 72, and Brief of Linda Marchiano, supra note 57, at 13-14 and 31-32 (describing
sexually violent passages and scenes from various books and films where women are
beaten, forced to have sex with animals, and threatened, wounded, or killed with guns
or knives).
104. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 10.
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III. THE DANGERs OF APPLICATION

The Minneapolis and Indianapolis ordinances embody a political view
that holds pornography to be a central force in "creating and maintaining"
the oppression of women.' °s This view appears in summary form in the
legislative findings section at the beginning of the Minneapolis bill, which
describes a chain reaction of misogynistic acts generated by
pornography." ° The legislation is based on the interweaving of several
themes: That pornography constructs the meaning of sexuality for women
and, as well, leads to discrete acts of violence against women; that

sexuality is the primary cause of women's oppression; that explicitly
sexual images, even if not violent or coerced, have the power to
subordinate women; and that women's own accounts of force have been

silenced because, as a universal and timeless rule, society credits
pornographic constructions rather than women's experiences.' ° Taking
the silencing contention a step further, advocates of the ordinance
effectively assume that women have been so conditioned by the
pornographic world view that if their own experiences of the sexual acts
identified in the definition are not subordinating, then they must simply be

victims of false consciousness.
The heart of the ordinance is the "trafficking" section, which would
allow almost anyone to seek the removal of any materials falling within
the law's definition of pornography.'°8 Ordinance defenders strenuously
105. See Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 1(a)(1); Indianapolis Ordinance,
supranote 3, § l(a)(2). The Indianapolis Ordinance states the findings of the Indianapolis
City Council as:
Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex which denies women
equal opportunities in society. Pornography is central in creating and
maintaining sex as a basis for discrimination. Pornography is a systematic
practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially
harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with the acts of
aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights in
employment, education, access to and use of public accommodations, and
acquisition of real property; promote rape, battery, child abuse, kidnapping
and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement of laws against such acts; and
contribute significantly to restricting women in particular from full exercise of
citizenship and participation in public life, including in neighborhoods.
Id.
106. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § l(a)(1).
107. Id. § 1-4.
108. Id. § 4(). The section reads as follows:
Discrimination by trafficking in pornography. The production, sale, exhibition,
or distribution of pornography is discrimination against women by means of
trafficking in pornography:
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protest that the issue is not censorship because the state, as such, is not
But the prospect of
authorized to initiate criminal prosecutions. 1"
having to defend a potentially infinite number of privately filed complaints
creates at least as much of a chilling effect against pornographic or sexual
speech as does a criminal law. And as long as representatives of the
state-in this case, judges-have ultimate say over the interpretation, the
distinction between this ordinance and "real" censorship will not hold.
In addition, three major problems should dissuade feminists from
supporting this kind of law: first, the sexual images in question do not
cause more harm than other aspects of misogynist culture; second,
sexually explicit speech, even in male-dominated society, serves positive
social functions for women; and third, the passage and enforcement of
anti-pornography laws such as those supported in Minneapolis and
Indianapolis are more likely to impede, rather than advance, feminist
goals.
Ordinance proponents contend that pornography does cause violence
because it conditions male sexual response to images of violence and thus
provokes violence against women."' The. strongest research they offer
is based on psychological experiments that employ films depicting a rape
scene, toward the end of which the woman is shown to be enjoying the
attack."' The ordinances, by contrast, cover a much broader range of
materials than this one specific heterosexual rape scenario. Further, the
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public
university and college libraries in which pornography is available for
study, including on open shelves, shall not be construed to be trafficking
in pornography but special display presentations of pornography in said
places is sex discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of
trafficking in pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy
to violate the civil rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting
against the subordination of women. Any man or transsexual who alleges
injury by pornography in the way women are injured by it shall also have
a cause of action.
Id. § 4(0(1), (2), (3).
109. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 55 (stating that
the Indianapolis Ordinance would not make any acts criminal, and therefore actionable
by the State).
110. See DwoRKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 19, at xxviii-xxix (describing
testimony before the Minnapolis City Council on the violence and degradation that
women suffer because of pornography).
111. Id. at 137-38.
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studies cited by ordinance supporters do not support the theory that
pornography causes violence against women."'
In addition, the argument that pornography itself plays a major role
in the general oppression of women contradicts the evidence of history.
It need hardly be said that pornography did not lead to the burning of
witches or the English common law treatment of women as chattel
property. If anything functioned then as the prime communication medium
for woman-hating, it was probably religion. Nor can pornography be
blamed for the enactment of laws from at least the eighteenth century that

allowed a husband td rape or beat his wife with impunity. 3 In any
period, the causes of women's oppression have been many and complex,
drawing on the fundamental social and economic structures of society.
Ordinance proponents offer little evidence to explain how the mass
production of pornography-a relatively recent phenomenon-could have
become so potent a causative agent so quickly.

The silencing of women is another example of the harm attributed to

pornography. 1

Yet if this argument were correct, one would expect

that as the social visibility of pornography has increased, the tendency to
credit women's accounts of rape would have decreased. In fact, although

the treatment of women complainants in rape cases is far from perfect,
efforts by the women's movement have resulted in marked improvements.
In many places, the corroboration requirement has now been
abolished;

5

evidence of a victim's sexual experiences has been made

112. Hunter & Law, supra note 15, at 112-14 (citing researchers, on whom
ordinance supporters relied, on the limited extent to which the social science literature
supports the hypothesis of a connection between pornography and violence against
women).
113. See, e.g., Thurmanv. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 (D. Conn.
1984) (stating that English common law during the eighteenth century recognized the
right of husbands to physically discipline their wives, and that American common law
adopted this right, provided that no permanent injury was inflicted upon the wife)
(citations omitted); State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 162, 163 (1864) (holding that "the
law permits [a husband] to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary
to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself.. ."). See also Kathleen E.
Mahoney, The ConstitutionalLaw ofEquality in Canada,24 N.Y.U. I. INT'L L. & POL.
759, 762 (1992) (chronicling the development of the common law and the rights of
women, and stating that the common law permitted a husband to beat his disobedient
wife and rape her without fear of punishment).
114. See CATHARn E A. MAcKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in
FE MM UNMODnZMD 127, 129-30 (1987) (arguing that pornography "promotes
freedom for men and enslavement and silence for women").
115. See Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A
Proposalforthe Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 399, 410-11 n.78
(1988) (noting that the corroboration requirement has been eliminated by statute and
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inadmissible;"1 and a number of police forces have developed specially
trained units and procedures to improve the handling of sexual assault
cases.l
The presence of rape fantasies in pornography may in part
reflect a backlash against these women's movement advances, but to argue
that most people routinely disbelieve women who file charges of rape
belittles the real improvements made in social consciousness and law.
The third type of harm is a kind of libel: The maliciously false
characterization of women as a group of sexual masochists."1 8 To claim
that all pornography is a lie is a false analogy. If truth is a defense to
charges of libel, then surely depictions of consensual sex cannot be
thought of as equivalent to a falsehood. For example, some women (and
men) do enjoy being tied up or displaying themselves. The declaration by
flat that even sadomasochism is a "lie" about sexuality reflects an
arrogance and moralism that feminists should combat, not engage in.
When mutually desired sexual experiences are depicted, pornography is
not "libelous."
Not only does pornography not cause the kind and degree of harm that
can justify the restraint of speech, but its existence serves some social
functions which benefit women. Pornographic speech has many, often
anomalous, characteristics. Certainly one is that it magnifies the misogyny
present in the culture and exaggerates the fantasy of male power.
Another, however, is that the existence of pornography has served to flout
conventional sexual mores, to ridicule sexual hypocrisy, and to underscore
the importance of sexual needs. Pornography carries many messages
other than woman-hating; it advocates sexual adventure, sex outside of
marriage, sex for no reason other than pleasure, casual sex, anonymous
sex, group sex, voyeuristic sex, illegal sex, public sex. Some of these
ideas appeal to women reading or seeing pornography, who may interpret
some images as legitimating their own sense of sexual urgency or desire
to be sexually aggressive. Women's experience of pornography is not as
universally victimizing as the ordinance would have it.
Anti-pornography laws, as restrictions on sexual speech, in many
ways echo and expand upon the traditional legal analysis of sexually
judicial decision because the victim's testimony is now believed to be as reliable as any
other form of evidence).
116. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (prohibiting admission of all opinion and
reputation evidence concerning a rape victim's prior sexual behavior but allowing other
evidence of the victim's sexual history under certain circumstances).
117. See Frank Tuerkheimer, A ReassessmentandRedefinitionofRape ShieldLaws,
50 OHIo ST. L.J. 1245, 1246 (1989) (stating that the development of sensitive crime
units has led to increased responsiveness to victims of sexual assault by law enforcement
agencies).
118. See DWORKN, supra note 19, at 148-49.

1993]

FALSE PROMISES

explicit speech under the rubric of obscenity. The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that sexual speech, defined as "obscenity," does not
belong in the system of public discourse, and is therefore an exception to
the First Amendment and hence not entitled to protection under the free
speech guarantee." 9 The definition of obscenity has shifted over the
years and remains imprecise. In 1957, the Supreme Court ruled that
obscenity could be suppressed regardless of whether it presented an
imminent threat of illegal activity. 1" In the opinion of the Supreme
Court, graphic sexual images do not communicate "real" ideas.12
These, it would seem, are found only in the traditionally defined public
arena. Sexual themes can qualify as ideas if they use sexuality for
argument's sake, but not if they speak in the words and images of
"private" life-that is, if they graphically depict sex itself. At least
theoretically, and insofar as the law functions as a pronouncement of
moral judgment, sex is consigned to remain unexpressed and in the private
realm.

The fallacies in this distinction are obvious.. Under the U.S.
Constitution, for example, it is acceptable to write "I am a sadomasochist"
or even "Everyone should experiment with sadomasochism in order to
increase sexual pleasure." But to write a graphic fantasy about
sadomasochism that arouses and excites readers is not protected unless a
court finds it to have serious literary, artistic or political value, despite the
expressive nature of the content. 1 Indeed, the fantasy depiction may
communicate identity in a more compelling way than the "I am"
statement. For sexual minorities, sexual acts can be self-identifying and
affirming statements in a hostile world. Images of those acts should be
protected for that reason, for they do have political content. Just as the
personal can be political, so can the specifically and graphically sexual.
Supporters of the anti-pornography ordinances both endorse the
concept that pornographic speech contains no ideas or expressive interest,
and at the same time attribute to pornography the capacity to trigger
violent acts by the power of its misogyny. The City's brief in defense of
119. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing guidelines for
the trier of fact to determine whether material is obscene and thus not protected by the
First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (rejecting claim that
obscene materials are protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (stating that lewd or obscene utterances are not an
essential part of any exposition of ideas).
120. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485-86.
121. Id. at 484-85.
122. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (announcing a three-part obscenity test, part of
which requires the work in question to have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific

value).
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the Indianapolis ordinance expanded this point by arguing that all sexually
explicit speech is entitled to less constitutional protection than other
speech. 12 The anti-pornography groups have cleverly capitalized on this
approach-a product of a totally nonfeminist legal system-to attempt,
through the mechanism of the ordinances, to legitimate a new crusade for
protectionism and sexual conservatism.
The consequences of enforcing such a law, however, are much more
likely to obstruct than advance feminist political goals. On the level of
ideas, further narrowing of the public realm of sexual speech coincides all
too well with the privatization of sexual, reproductive and family issues
sought by the far right. Practically speaking, the ordinances could result
in attempts to eliminate the images associated with homosexuality.
Doubtless there are heterosexual women who believe that lesbianism is a
"degrading" form of "subordination." Since the ordinances allow for
suits against materials in which men appear "in place of women," far-right
anti-pornography crusaders could use these laws to suppress gay male
pornography.
Imagine a Jerry Falwell-style conservative filing a
complaint against a gay bookstore for selling sexually explicit materials
showing men with other men in "degrading" or "submissive" or
"objectified" postures-all in the name of protecting women.
And most ironically, while the ordinances would do nothing to
improve the material conditions of most women's lives, their high
visibility might well divert energy from the drive to enact other, less
popular laws that would genuinely empower women-comparable worth
legislation, for example, or affirmative action requirements, or fairer
property and support principles in divorce laws.
Other provisions of the ordinances concern coercive behavior:
physical assault which is imitative of pornographic images directly,1 4
coercion into pornographic performance," and forcing pornography on
others." On close examination, however, most of these provisions are
problematic.
Existing law already penalizes physical assault, including when it is
associated with pornography. Defenders of the laws often cite the
example of models who have been raped or otherwise harmed while in the
process of making pornographic images. But victims of this type of attack
123. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 17, 27, and 34.
124. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(o).

125. Id. § 4(m).
126. Id. § 4(n).

1993]

FALSE PROMISES

can already sue or prosecute those responsible." Indeed, the ordinances
do not cover assault or other harm incurred while producing pornography,
presumably because other laws already achieve that end.
The ordinances do penalize coercing, intimidating or fraudulently
inducing anyone into performing for pornography. 12 Although existing
law already provides remedies for fraud or contracts of duress, this section
of the ordinance seeks to facilitate recovery of damages by, for example,
pornography models who might otherwise encounter substantial prejudice
against their claims. Supporters of this section have suggested that it is
comparable to the Supreme Court's ban on child pornography. 1" The
analogy has been stretched to the point where the City of Indianapolis
brief argued that women, like children, need "special protection."" 3
"[C]hildren are incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic
conduct, even absent physical coercion and therefore require special
protection," the brief stated."' "By the same token, the physical and
psychological well-being of women ought to be afforded comparable
protection for the coercive environment in which most pornographic
any notion that they consent or 'choose' to perform
models work vitiates
1
in pornography." 3
The reality of women's lives is far more complicated. Women do not
become pornography models because society is egalitarian and they
exercise a "free choice," but neither do they "choose" this work because
they have lost all power for deliberate, volitional behavior. Modeling or
acting for pornography, like prostitution, can be a means of survival for
those with limited options. For some women, at some points in their
lives, it is a rational economic decision. Not every woman regrets having
127. See James R. Branit, Reconciling Free Speech and Equalky: Wat Justifies
Censorship?,9 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 429, 449 (1986) (pointing out that virtually
every offense which occurs during the filming of pornography has a remedy in existing
criminal and civil law).
128. Minneapolis Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4(m); Indianapolis Ordinance, supra

note 3, § 2(g)(5).
129. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 23-24
(asserting that just as a child is incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic
conduct, "the coercive environment in which most pornographic models work vitiates any
notion that they consent or 'choose' to perform"); Osbornev. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
(holding that a state's prohibition against the possession and viewing of child
pornography complies with the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (holding that child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection
provided that the conduct prohibited is adequately defined by applicable state law).
130. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 24.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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made it, although no woman should have to settle for it. The fight should
be to expand the options, as well as to insure job safety for women who
do become pornography models. By contrast, the impact of the ordinance
as a whole would be either to eliminate jobs or drive the pornography
industry further underground.
One of the vaguest provisions in the ordinance prohibits "forcing"
pornography on a person."
"Forcing" is not defined in the law, and
one is left to speculate whether it means forced to respond to
pornography, forced to read it, or forced to glance at it before turning
away. Also unclear is whether the perpetrator must in fact have some
superior power over the, person being forced-that is, is there a
meaningful threat that makes the concept of force real.
Again, widely varying situations are muddled and a consideration of
context is absent. "Forcing" pornography on a person "in any public
space" is treated identically to using it as a method of sexual harassment
in the workplace. 4 The scope of "forcing" could include walking past
a newsstand or browsing in a bookstore that had pornography on display.
The force involved in such a situation seems mild when compared, for
example, to the incessant sexist advertising on television.
The concept behind the, "forcing" provision is appropriate, however,
in the case of workplace harassment. A worker should not have to
endure, especially on pain of losing her job, harassment based on sex,
race, religion, nationality or any other factor. This general policy was
established by the U.S. courts as part of the guarantees of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.1" Pornography used as a means of harassing
women workers is already legally actionable, just as harassment in the
workplace by racial slurs is actionable. " Any literature endorsing the
133. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(n).
134. Id.
135. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (holding that Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is not limited to
economic or tangible discrimination, but extends to the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work
in discriminatorily hostile or abusive environments); Mertor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination actionable under the Title VII employment discrimination
statute).
136. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs v. Human Rights
Comm'n, 541 N.E.2d 1248 (Il. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that a former probationary
police officer proved his allegations of racial harassment and discriminatory discharge
and was entitled to back pay and damages); Broad Elm Auto Centers v. New York State
Div. of Human Rights, 552 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that unlawful
racial discrimination encompasses racial or ethnic assaults and harassment).
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oppression of women-whether pornography or the Bible-could be
employed as a harassment device to impede a woman's access to a job, or
to education, public accommodations or other social benefits. It is the
usage of pornography in this situation, not the image itself, that is
discriminatory. Appropriately, this section of the Minneapolis ordinance
provides that only perpetrators of the forcing, not makers and distributors
of the images, could be held liable.'"

Forcing pornography on a person is also specifically forbidden "in
[the] home."" In her testimony before the Indianapolis City Council,
Catharine MacKinnon referred to the problem of pornography being
"forced on wives in preparation for later sexual scenes."" Since only
the person who forces the pornography on another can be sued, this
provision becomes a kind of protection against domestic harassment. It
would allow wives to seek court orders against husbands or damages for
some uses of pornography. Although this is a fascinating attempt to
subvert male power in the domestic realm, it nonetheless has problems.
"Forcing" is not an easy concept to define in this context. It is hard to
know what degree of intrusion would amount to forcing images onto a
person who shares the same private space.
More important, the focus on pornography seems to be a displacement
of the more fundamental issues involved in the conflicts that occur
between husbands and wives, or lovers, over sex. Some men may invoke
images that reflect their greater power to pressure women into performing
the supposedly traditional role of acceding to male desires. Pornography
may facilitate or enhance this dynamic of male dominance, but it is
hardly the causative agent. Nor would removing the pornography do
much to solve the problem. If the man invokes instead his friends' stories
about sexual encounters or his experiences with other women, is the
resulting interaction with his wife substantially different? Focusing on the
pornography, rather than on the relationship and its social context, may
serve only to channel heterosexual women's recognition of their own
intimate oppression toward a movement hailed by the far right as being
anti-perversion rather than toward a feminist analysis of sexual politics.
The last of the sections that deals with actual coercive conduct is one
that attempts to deal with the assault, physical injury or attack of any
person in a way that is directly caused by specific pornography." The
ordinance would allow a lawsuit against the makers and distributors of
pornographic materials that were imitated by an attacker-the only
137. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(n).

138. Id.
139. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 57, at 10, 12.
140. Minneapolis Ordinance, supranote 2, § 4(o).
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provision of the ordinance that requires proof of causation. 41
Presenting such proof would be extremely difficult. If the viewer's willful
decision to imitate the image were found to be an intervening, superseding
cause of the harm, the plaintiff would lose.
The policy issues here are no different from those concerning violent
media images that are nonsexual: Is showing an image sufficient to cause
an act of violence? Even if an image could be found to cause a viewer's
behavior, was that behavior reasonably foreseeable? So far, those who
have produced violent films have not been found blameworthy when third
persons acted out the violence depicted. If this were to change, it would
mean, for example, that the producer of the TV movie The Burning Bed,
which told the true story of a battered wife who set fire to her sleeping
husband, could be sued if a woman who saw the film killed her husband
in a similar way. The result, of course, would be the end of films
depicting real violence in the lives of women.
The ordinances' supporters offer no justification for singling out
sexual assault from other kinds of violence. Certainly the experience of
sexual assault is not always worse than that of being shot or stabbed or
suffering other kinds of nonsexual assault. Nor is sexual assault the only
form of violence that is fueled by sexism. If there were evidence that
sexual images are more likely to be imitated, there might be some
justification for treating them differently. But there is no support for this
contention.
Laws which would increase the state's regulation of sexual images
present many dangers for women. Although these proposals draw much
of their feminist support from women's anger at the market for images of
sexual violence, they are aimed not at violence, but at sexual explicitness.
Far-right elements recognize the possibility of using the full potential of
the ordinances to enforce their sexually conservative world view, and have
supported them for that reason.142 Feminists should therefore look
carefully at the text of these "model" laws in order to understand why
many believe them to be a useful tool in anti-feminist moral crusades.
The proposed ordinances are dangerous because they seek to embody
in law an analysis of the role of sexuality and sexual images in the
oppression of women with which even all feminists do not agree.
Underlying virtually every section of the proposed laws there is an
assumption that sexuality is a realm of unremitting, unequaled
victimization for women. Pornography appears as the monster that made
this so. The ordinances' authors seek to impose their analysis by putting
state power behind it. But this analysis is not the only feminist
perspective on sexuality. Feminist theorists have also argued that the
141. Id.
142. See Duggan, supra note 4, at 11.
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163

sexual terrain, however power-laden, is actively contested. Women are
agents, and not merely victims, who make decisions and act on them, and
who desire, seek out, and enjoy sexuality.

